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ABSTRACT 
Private participation in the provision of public services is often promoted as a 
means to reducing production costs in the public sector. In this study, I test this result using 
a twelve-year panel dataset of 343 public school districts in Minnesota. The voting behavior 
of residents in the state‟s House elections and school districts‟ prior experience with 
contractors are used as instruments to control for the endogenous decision to outsource. The 
first stage results from fixed-effects two stage least squares (2SLS) regression show that the 
two instruments, population density and the number of school days increase the likelihood 
of outsourcing while wages have a negative effect. The second stage results, from the fixed-
effects 2SLS regression show that the use of private contractors increases total 
transportation costs by 21 percent, a much greater effect than when the endogenous 
decision to outsource is ignored. However, as a share of total expenditure, outsourcing 
increases the ratio by about 2 percent; thus showing evidence of the cost burden that 
outsourcing imposes on school finances. The much smaller effect here however, may 
explain why school districts continue to use contractors despite the overwhelming empirical 
evidence against outsourcing.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
School boards across the United States are saddled with the question of how to 
perform their various duties cheaply without compromising on quality. School districts 
must decide whether to provide a certain service using employees in-house, from outside 
sources, or some combination of the two thereof. Outsourcing is the “contracting out” of a 
service traditionally delivered by public employees. The desire to save costs has been 
identified throughout the existing literature as one of the major reasons for outsourcing 
(Kremic et al., 2006; O‟Toole and Meier, 2004; Arnold, 2000; Willcocks et al., 1995; and 
Farris, 1986). Cost savings are possible because outsourcing combines the competitive 
pressures of private sector with the coordination, scale economies, and social goals of 
public provision (Warner, 2001). In the K-12 education sector, outsourcing often involves 
using private sector contractors to provide support services (pupil transportation, food 
services, and custodial services); although Rho (2013) finds evidence of outsourcing the 
core function of pupil instruction in some school districts in Texas. 
The use of competitive outsourcing to auction the right to supply some specified 
service(s) or good reduces the contractor's bargaining power when there is a sufficient 
supply of contractors (Lyons and Sekkat, 1991).  This means if there is a competitive 
supply of contractors then a school district‟s payments to the contractor with the winning 
bid will be less than payments to losing bidders. School districts that outsource also gain by 
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concentrating on their core mission of providing instructional activities while contractors 
concentrate on moving pupils to and from school. The likelihood of cost savings is further 
enhanced by the fact that a contractor can provide services to neighboring districts thereby 
lowering cost through economies of scale (Kremic et al., 2006; Roberts, 2001). These costs 
savings can then be shared between the contractor and the school districts. In general, the 
theoretical literature supports the use of outsourcing as a cost-saving device (Bajari and 
Tadelis 1999), but the empirical evidence from the pupil transportation industry (as in 
others) has been mixed. For instance, Thompson (2011), Lazarus and McCullough (2005), 
Hutchinson and Pratt (2007), Cassell (2000), Hutchinson and Pratt (1999), Alspaugh 
(1996), and Harding (1990) find that outsourcing increases pupil transportation costs. On 
the other hand, Bails (1979, McGuire and van Cott (1984), Ross (1988) and Damask (2000) 
find that outsourcing leads to costs savings.   
Several reasons may explain the mixed results. One of the main reasons for the 
conflicting empirical results may be because of the different definitions of the outsourcing 
variable in the empirical literature. The most popular measure is a dummy variable set 
equal to one if a district engages a contractor and zero otherwise. Outsourcing has also 
been defined as a ratio of the number of buses operated by a district to the number operated 
by a contractor (Thompson, 2011). In studies on public transit in the United States, the 
outsourcing variable is sometimes defined as a set of three dummy variables: full-
outsourcing, partial-outsourcing, and in-house. Each dummy is set equal to one, depending 
on the outsourcing decision of the public transit managers. Per this trichonomous definition 
of the outsourcing variable, Iseki (2010) finds that partial-outsourcing reduces costs while 
full-outsourcing and in-house service provision increases costs. Each of these definitions of 
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the outsourcing variable has its advantages, but as will be demonstrated later in this paper, 
their shortcomings may not make them applicable to the pupil transportation industry and 
the task of measuring the causal effect of outsourcing on costs. An alternative measure is 
thus proposed in this study: a dummy variable that assumes the value one if a school 
provides all of its to-and-from-school transportation service using outside sources, and zero 
otherwise.  
One of the main reasons for the mixed results is due to fact that all of the studies 
reviewed here have relied on different types of data. The majority of studies have relied on 
a single school-year of data. As noted by Duflo and Kremer (2005), the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of social intervention policies using a cross-sectional sample typically suffers 
from the fact that those who receive treatment may be different from those who do not. 
Unfortunately, this is the situation of most studies in the pupil transportation industry. The 
main limitation is often the absence of data prior to the adoption of outsourcing. This often 
means that the researcher has to rely on data that have become available after the adoption 
of outsourcing as a policy stance. Under such circumstances, the estimated cost difference 
between contractor-operated services and in-house services may not necessarily reflect the 
true effect of the adoption of outsourcing on costs. The difference may simply be due time 
invariant factors such as the physical size of the school district, and unsystematic events 
such as unusually harsh weather conditions or high gas price. It may as well be due to the 
impact of the program. Hence, there is a need to disentangle these two effects. Besides, 
contractors generally lower their bids to win contracts but increase their bids over time as 
they build relationships. Thus, a study using a year or a few years of observations may not 
capture this trend. This study addresses the data issues by using a twelve-year long panel 
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dataset. The dataset also has information on pre- and post-outsourcing data and thus the 
ability to estimate the ceteris paribus effect of outsourcing on costs.  
Another reason for the different results is the measure of costs used in these 
previous studies. Some studies have used total costs as the dependent variable. Others have 
used average costs such as per pupil costs, cost per mile, cost per square miles, cost per 
bus, and cost per bus per mile, among others. All these measures may help tell a different 
story about the impact of outsourcing on costs. For instance, while outsourcing may 
increase costs, measures such as cost per mile may indicate that outsourcing reduces costs 
if the contractor records a relatively higher growth in miles than in costs. Using cost per 
mile may therefore indicate that a school district is seeing a reduction in costs when the 
opposite is true. It is worthy of note that what matters to school districts as far as pupil 
transportation is concerned, include the safety of all pupils transported, timeliness of the 
service and the costs of transporting pupils to and from school1. Thus, the measures of costs 
explored in this study are total costs and cost per pupil transported. The study also uses 
population density at the county level as a proxy for travel time and idling time of school 
buses; which have cost implications.     
A major challenge in empirical studies on the impact of outsourcing on costs 
remains dealing with the endogenous nature of the outsourcing decision. The outsourcing 
decision is often treated as a random assignment in empirical work. However this is not the 
case in reality. This is because districts that outsource may differ in a number of ways from 
                                                                 
1
 These were contained a survey report conducted on behalf of  the state House of Representatives in 2013 , 
“A Legislative Study of Student Transportation”  
Available at http://www.mn.gov/admin/images/Study_Student_Transportation.pdf 
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those that produce in-house. Failing to address the endogeneity of the decision to outsource 
may bias the results in a study. The bias, although may be reduced by controlling for 
observable school characteristics, the possibility of bias remains from unobserved variables 
that determine the production choice (that is, through a contractor or using in-house 
capacity) such as the school board‟s ability, motivation for costs control or some other 
characteristic of a school boards‟ background. For example, higher unobserved motivation 
for cost control among outsourcing districts can erroneously lead to the conclusion that 
outsourcing reduces costs relative to districts producing in-house even if there is no 
difference in the underlying cost structure between these districts. To deal with this source 
of endogeneity the study includes a measure of a school‟s district managerial ability2. A 
second source of endogeneity is the reverse causality that arises from the fact that a school 
district‟s decision to produce in-house or outsource may depend on the expected level of 
pupil transportation costs as much as it‟s observed costs depends on the decision to 
outsource. How much of the service being outsourced can greatly influence costs. For 
service that may involve the use of assets very specific to the industry, too little 
outsourcing may mean the outsourcing agency paying a lot more in compared to situations 
where a much larger service is being outsourced. Whatever the case, public agencies that 
outsource get to see the price tag of the service even before the service is provided. The 
associated price tag is very much dependent on the quantity of the product/service being 
outsourced and the degree of asset specificity. 
                                                                 
2
 Thompson (2011) has argued that although ignoring managerial ability contributes to the endogeneity of the 
decision to outsource, it may not be an issue in empirical analysis since such abilities change slowly over 
time. Ignoring it however means deliberately increasing the likelihood of obtaining biased results.   
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Therefore, establishing the causal effects of outsourcing on pupil transportation 
costs requires an exogenous source of variation in the production choice. I use the voting 
behavior of Minnesota residents and districts‟ experience with outsourcing before the 
change in the pupil transportation law as instruments. Following Iseki (2010), I use the 
voting behavior of Minnesota residents in the state House elections as an instrument for the 
decision to outsource. Intuitively, differential voting behavior across the state induces 
quasi-experimental differences on school districts‟ governance structures and these 
differences may be important for both those districts that believe they have high costs of 
pupil transportation and those that believe they have low pupil transportation costs. This 
may induce outsourcing for both high and low cost districts motivated by a desire to realize 
lower costs. Similarly, districts that have prior experience may be more likely to outsource 
or less likely to outsource depending on their past experience with contractors in the pupil 
transportation industry. The assumption here is that there is variation in the support for 
outsourcing in the education sector based on one‟s political orientation or previous 
experience with private suppliers. The nature of the endogenous decision to outsource, its 
consequence on empirical studies, and how to address it are explored further in this study.  
The dataset used in this study consists of data on 343 Minnesota public school 
districts. Minnesota is interesting because until 1997 it was illegal for a school district to 
apply funds meant for pupil transportation to any of its other operations, such as purchasing 
office supplies or classroom supplies that may enhance teaching and learning. The 1997 
change in the funding mechanism added transportation funds to the General Fund. The 
General Fund is the discretionary budget component for a school district. Thus, per the 
1997 change, school districts can allocate any cost savings in pupil transportation to other 
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needs, such as office supplies. This change in funding certainly created an incentive 
towards cost reduction. Reducing costs involves making a decision regarding whether to 
provide pupil transportation in-house (make) or outsource (buy). The dataset allows for an 
examination of the nature of school districts that outsource and the differences in 
operational costs between the districts outsourcing and those producing in-house. In 
addition, the Minnesota school districts‟ dataset offers an opportunity to examine the nature 
of the districts that switched from in-house to using a contractor to transport their pupils 
and the resulting impact of this decision on costs.  
 In sum, this paper differs from other studies on the tasks of measuring the impact 
of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs by: (1) taking into account the endogenous 
nature of the decision to outsource, (2) using a twelve-year panel dataset that covers all 
public school districts in Minnesota, and (3) using a sample of districts that have both pre- 
and post-outsourcing adoption costs to estimate the effect of outsourcing on costs. A 
byproduct of the methods employed in this paper is that the factors that influence the 
decision to outsource in the pupil transportation industry are also examined. The rest of the 
study is organized in the following way: Section 2 provides some background information 
about the school districts, finances and governance structure in Minnesota, Section 3 
examines the nature of outsourcing in the public sector, Section 3 reviews the literature, 
Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents the empirical framework, and Section 6 
presents the results. The results are then discussed in Section 7 and some policy issues 
examined. Concluding comments are made in Section 8. 
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2.0 THE PUPIL TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN MN: 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE  
This section presents an overview of the study area, Minnesota (MN). It examines the 
nature of school districts regarding their day to day management, finances and the nature of 
the pupil transportation industry. This is important as it offers an insight into the nature of 
the PK-12 education sector, the decision making process and nature of student 
transportation costs across districts.   
 
2.1 Public School Districts, Management and Finances 
The provision of public elementary and secondary education in Minnesota is 
partnership between the state on one hand and local school districts and charter schools on 
the other. The geographic boundaries of a local school district are determined by the 
Minnesota Department of Education (DoE). In most cases, a local school district must 
admit all pupils who live within its borders. A school district is often made up of a number 
of schools serving PK-12 pupils. Complimenting school districts are charter schools, which 
began appearing in the early 1990s. Charter schools are independently operated public 
schools started by parents, teachers, community organizations, and for-profit companies. 
These schools like public school districts receive state funding but the sponsoring group 
may also come up with private funding. These schools must adhere to the basic curricular 
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requirements of the state but are free from many of the regulations that apply to traditional 
schools. Unlike public schools, they are not subject to the scrutiny of school boards or 
government authorities. Charter schools usually specialize in a particular area of study, 
such as technology or the arts, or adopt a basic core-subjects approach. Some charter 
schools specifically target gifted or high-risk kids. They usually have smaller classes and 
offer more individual attention than conventional public schools. During the 2012-2013 
school-year, there were 336 school districts and 158 charter schools in Minnesota with 
844,000 pupils3. Full-time equivalent teaching staff was 52,173. In addition, an estimated 
70,715 pupils were enrolled in nonpublic schools, and 17,129 pupils were homeschooled.  
Public schools get their financing from local, state, and federal government funds, 
but their day-to-day management rests with an elected school board. The school board is 
charged with the care, management and control of the affairs of the school district and 
consists of six members elected to four-year terms and a seventh member if so approved by 
voters in the school district  (Minn. Stat. § 123B.09, Subd. 1.). School board members are 
elected during the November General Election on either odd or even years. At least three 
members are on the ballot during each election. The school board issues bonds with voter 
approval, levies taxes, hires and discharges employees, contracts for services, and 
purchases facilities and equipment4. School boards hire, direct, and evaluate the 
performance of a superintendent who handles the day-to-day administrative affairs of the 
school district. 
                                                                 
3
 Appendix 2 presents a list of all school districts used in this study.  
4
 Minn. Stat. § 123B.02 outline the duties of a school district.  
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Funding for school districts come from the local, state and federal government. The 
Minnesota school finance system is the method by which funds are provided to operate 
public elementary and secondary schools. The bulk of state support for elementary and 
secondary education is distributed to school districts through the general education revenue 
program, which provides money for the current operating expenditures of the districts. The 
remaining portion of the state‟s appropriation to local districts is provided through special 
purpose or categorical aids, such as special education aid and local property tax relief aids. 
School districts also receive state appropriations through categorical aids, which are funds 
designated for specific purposes (such as special education and school integration or 
desegregation). For the 2012-2013 academic year, the state provided approximately 66 
percent of the total costs of elementary and secondary education. Local revenue sources 
(primarily property taxes and fees for services such as school lunch) provided 
approximately 28 percent of 2012-2013 operating revenues, and the federal government 
provided approximately 6 percent. The bulk of state support for elementary and secondary 
education is distributed to the districts through the general education revenue program.  
Funding mechanisms for school districts have undergone several changes since 
1960. The current funding mechanism takes its roots from the First Session of the 1987 
Legislature. The 1987 funding mechanism replaced the foundation aid program with a 
modified funding formula called the general education revenue program, effective for the 
1998-1989 academic year. General education revenue is the primary formula for providing 
general operating funds to school districts and charter schools. General education formula 
components have remained relatively stable since 1989. Each component is expected to 
reflect school district funding needs in different areas and is therefore based on number of 
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pupils and different need. A school district‟s general education revenue is the sum of 15 
components, including basic revenue and transportation sparsity revenue. Basic education 
revenue for each district equals the product of the formula allowance multiplied by the 
pupil units for the school year. Sparsity revenue provides additional revenue to 
geographically large districts that have relatively few secondary pupils. The formula 
measures sparsity and isolation of the district and then provides additional revenue to the 
district using an assumption about how many pupil units are necessary to run an acceptable 
secondary program. The formula assumes that a district with 400 secondary pupils in 
average daily attendance can provide an acceptable secondary program. Therefore, a 
district with one high school, no matter how few pupils per square mile it has, will not 
receive any sparsity aid if the district has a secondary average daily membership (SADM) 
in excess of 400. In addition, the requirement of large geographic size ensures funding for 
districts that have few pupils due to geographic isolation and not due to a school board‟s 
reluctance to cooperate with a neighboring school district that may have the capacity to 
absorb secondary level pupils. 
There is a lot of variation in annual per pupil expenditures across school districts in 
Minnesota. Variations occur according to the regional characteristics and level of pupil 
need. Total general fund expenditures per pupil and instruction and instruction- related 
expenditures are highest in cities compared to non-city districts. Administration and 
transportation expenditures per pupil tend to be highest in rural– remote and city districts. 
Compared with other locales, rural– remote districts had lower enrollment and pupil 
population density, longer drive times to the nearest urban area, and higher shares of 
12 
 
economically disadvantaged pupils and special education pupils. Within rural and town 
districts, the percentage of these pupils increased with remoteness. 
 
2.2 The Pupil Transportation Industry in Minnesota 
The combined expenditure of all states on pupil transportation in the United States 
was over $23 billion in 2011 (Cornman, 2013). The Environmental Protection Agency 
estimates that some 25 million pupils are transported to and from school each day in about 
600,000 yellow school buses, providing nearly 11 billion pupil trips and accumulating four 
billion miles each year. Over 200,000 of school buses are operated by some 4,000 private 
companies.  While one may argue that the pupil transportation industry in Minnesota is 
largely homogenous in terms of the various laws that govern it, several differences 
however exist in terms of actual organization from one district to the other.  
Section 123B.88 of Minnesota Statutes spells out the categories of pupils that must 
be transported. School districts are required to provide “To-and-from” school transportation 
to any pupil who lives two or more miles away from her school. “To-and-from” school 
transportation is defined as the pupil‟s trip to school at the beginning of the school day and 
the trip home at the end of the school day. It is however, a local school district‟s decision 
on whether or not to transport pupils who live less than two miles from school. 
The laws also allow school districts a choice between providing pupil transportation 
in-house, fully outsourcing, or some combination of contractor provision and in-house 
production. The Minnesota Department of Education (DoE) recommends that school 
districts contract services for one year. To outsource, school districts must publicly 
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advertise for the supply of the product. This is aimed at introducing competition into the 
production process. Unfortunately, advertising may not make much of a difference in terms 
of generating competition since there exists one local transport provider in many counties 
or the school district may not be large enough to attract the needed number of private 
providers needed to generate competition. Although most cost components are spelt out in 
the contract, adjustments may occur if gas prices increase during the school year. 
Multinational companies such as First Pupil may not be interested in bidding for service in 
small school districts.  
The DoE spent a little over $9 billion on education in 2013; this works to $10,665 
per pupil. Regular instruction expenditure accounted for about 44 percent of the 
expenditure while pupil transportation accounted for about 6 percent. Public school 
districts transported 681,033 pupils using 16,472 buses during the year. The majority of 
buses are of Type C and Type D5. While the two classes of buses form 73 percent of 
districts fleet, they form 54 percent of contractors‟ fleet. Total mileage covered by all buses 
was 127 million miles with contractors accounting for 64 percent of the miles.  
A better insight into the pupil transportation can be gained by looking at the 
activities of school districts during a single school year. For this purpose, I examine the 
most recent school year in this study, 2013. During the year under review, about 80 percent 
of all school districts in Minnesota engaged a contractor to provide some or all of their 
pupil transportation services. Out of the 268 school districts using a contractor, 20 percent 
                                                                 
5
 School buses are restricted to a maximum width of 102in and a maximum length of 45ft. They are designed 
to carry between 16 and 90 passengers (including drivers and any other s taff). The maximum passenger 
capacity for a Type C is 70 and 90 for Type D.  Type A busses are designed to carry between 16 and 36 
pupils while B is designed to carry a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 36 passenger. 
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of these districts relied on a contractor for all of their pupil transportation. Public school 
districts transported 633,771 pupils. The average cost per district was $722,000, and per 
pupil cost stood at $523. There was a lot of variation in costs across districts as shown in 
Table 2. For instance, while Franconia recorded the lowest total costs of $14,815, Anoka-
Hennipin recorded the highest total costs of $10.2 million. Anoka-Hennipin also 
transported the largest number of pupils: 31,830 pupils. Hendricks School District 
transported the lowest number of pupils: 73. Table 2 shows the top and bottom five districts 
according to their total transportation costs and their corresponding cost per pupil 
transported, cost per mile, total miles, and production choice (outsource or in-house 
production). There is an equal number of districts that outsourced in the category “high 
costs” districts and bottom five districts. This may suggests that both low- and high-cost 
school districts are motivated by the costs reduction benefits of outsourcing as argued by 
proponents. 
The biggest contractor is First Pupil (a subsidiary of First Group), with annual 
operating income estimated at around $20-50 million6. Interestingly, the districts with the 
highest and lowest total cost engaged contractors for all their pupil transportation needs, 
while the districts with the lowest and highest cost per pupil produced in-house. In districts 
that fully outsourced, average cost at the district level was $400,565 compared to $154,204 
for districts that produced fully in-house. Average cost per pupil transported was $396 for 
districts that fully outsourced and $355 for districts that fully produced in-house.  
 
                                                                 
6
 Estimates from online searches. First Group is the leading student transport operator in the UK and North 
America. 
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3.0 THE LITERATURE ON OUTSOURCING AND THE PUPIL 
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 
A few studies have examined impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs. A 
survey of reveal conflicting results regarding the cost effects of outsourcing on costs. For 
instance, while Thompson (2011), Lazarus and McCullough (2005), Alspaugh (1996), 
Harding (1990), Hutchinson and Pratt (1999), Cassell (2000), and Hutchinson and Pratt 
(2007) conclude that outsourcing increases pupil transportation costs, Damask (2000) Ross 
(1988), McGuire and van Cott (1984), and Bails (1979) find evidence in support of 
outsourcing as a means to reducing costs. Many of these studies have examined the effect 
outsourcing on both total and average transportation costs.  
Researchers have also examined whether outsourcing affects rural and urban school 
districts differently. For instance, Lazarus and McCullough (2005) report a 4 percent 
increase in cost in urban school districts compared to an 18 percent increase in costs for 
rural school districts. Thompson (2011) observes a similar differential impact; 14 percent 
increase in costs for urban school districts and 19 percent in nonurban areas.  
The studies that have been reviewed here as well as this one aim at estimating the 
impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation cost. The basic empirical method involves 
estimating some form of a cost function with a measure of outsourcing included as one of 
the independent variables. The sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated 
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coefficient on the outsourcing variable are then evaluated. This strategy can produce 
reliable ceteris paribus estimate of the effect outsourcing has on costs; so long as the 
explanatory variables are exogenous. Unfortunately, the potential for bias remains due to 
the fact that the outsourcing variable is not randomly assigned. Other potential sources of 
biased results include failing to deal with managerial abilities, individual district 
differences (due to location for instance), and special occurrence during the school year. 
Although most of these can be reduced if not eliminated through the use of panel data, 
many of the studies used one year of school data. Cross-sectional data analysis takes into 
account heterogeneity among school districts, but not variance within districts over time 
that may determine transition from one level of outsourced service to another. A researcher 
may attempt to avoid this (for example; Pucher, Markstedt, and Hirshman, 1983 study on 
US public transit) by using a dummy variable to represent different years of observations. 
In this case, a year dummy variable can pick up the effects of variables that vary over time 
but not among agencies, and it also leaves out the effects of variables that vary over time 
and among districts.  
The range of explanatory variables used in the studies also varies. Pupil head count, 
district size, number of miles travelled by school buses and some measure of outsourcing 
are included in all studies. Apart from these other variables such as gas prices (Lazarus and 
McCullough, 2005), wages (Lazarus and McCullough, 2005), driver salary (Hutchinson & 
Pratt, 1999), population density (Thompson, 2011; Hutchinson & Pratt, 1999), and number 
of school days (Thompson, 2011; Hutchinson & Pratt, 1999). When considering the 
relative strengths of the independent variables used in the previous studies, it important to 
note that many critical cost determinants are very difficult or even impossible to measure 
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with any degree of accuracy. Some of these determinants include the competence of 
administrators and managers, the competitive environment in which contracting occurs, the 
topographies of routes in a district and the degree of oversight exercised by school boards.  
The key variable of interest here as in previous studies is a measure of the 
outsourcing variable. From the empirical literature, outsourcing is traditionally defined as a 
dummy variable set equal to one if a public agency uses a contractor to provide some or all 
of its transportation needs, and zero otherwise. Hutchinson & Pratt (2007) in a study of the 
Louisiana school system, however define the outsourcing variable as a set of dummy 
variables: full outsourcing, mostly outsourcing, and mostly in-house. Each category is then 
compared to fully in-house cost of provision. Iseki (2010) argues partial outsourcing 
explains that agencies that partially outsource see higher cost savings than those that fully 
outsource. He attributes this difference in costs savings to the threat of outsourcing more of 
the in-house production. Due to a similar threat of insourcing to already outsourced service, 
contractors are also more likely to contain costs than if this threat was absent. In some 
studies, the outsourcing variable has also been so that it is continuous variable. For 
instance, it has been defined the ratio of buses operated by a contractor to the total number 
of buses serving a school district within a year (Thompson, 2011). It has also been defined 
as the ratio of contractor bus miles to total miles recorded by all buses that served a school 
district the academic year (Thompson, 2011; Ross, 1988).  
The peculiar nature of the pupil transportation industry does not make these 
definitions directly applicable. Assume a school district engages a contractor to bus some 
of its pupils for a month during the school year. The contractor uses 10 buses to perform 
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this function. If the district itself operates 10 buses, then the definition of outsourcing as a 
ratio yields a 50 percent level of outsourcing, partial-outsourcing (according to the 
trichotomous definition of outsourcing by Iseki, 2010) or outsourcing (according to the 
traditional view). The issue that arises here is whether this scenario qualifies as outsourcing 
and the definition of outsourcing that is most appropriate. A related issue has to do with 
route(s) allotted to the contractors. Is the level of outsourcing the same although a 
contractor transports pupils who reside a few miles away from a school while another has 
to deal with pupils several miles away? Also, is the level of outsourcing the same if two 
school districts are identical but differ in the size of buses used by their respective 
contractors? For instance, both school districts partially outsource, but one uses a 
contractor with 10 large buses while the other uses a contractor with 10 small buses. To 
overcome such controversial issues surrounding the definition of outsourcing in the nature 
of the pupil transportation industry, and, because the objective of this paper is to examine 
the impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs, outsourcing here is an indicator 
variable which assumes the value of one if a school district‟s pupil transportation function 
is fully carried out by a contractor, and zero otherwise. 
Table 2 presents a summary table of studies in the pupil transportation industry. The 
table includes study area, number of observation, explanatory variables, and results for 
each study. 
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4.0 DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
The main dataset for my analysis comes from administrative files and public records of 
Minnesota Department of Education (DoE). The panel dataset is based is based on 343 
public school districts covering the period 2002-2013. The DoE collects data on both 
public school districts and nonpublic schools on an annual basis. The data include school 
and district-level information on finance, personnel, and pupil information such as 
attendance and test scores. Financial data include various sources of revenue and 
expenditure during the school year. Some expenditure variables include salaries and 
benefits for instructional and non-instructional staff, pupil transportation costs, and 
maintenance costs. There is also information on the number of buses a school district 
engaged during the school. These busses are further divided into the number operated by a 
school district and the number operated by a contractor. This information however does not 
go further to indicate the period a particular bus served the district. This is one of the 
reasons why the outsourcing variable is simply defined as an indicator variable set equal to 
one if a district fully outsources and zero otherwise. As explained above, the other 
advantages of this definition is that one does not have to be concerned about kind of routes 
the contractor is assigned nor the size of buses different contractors use. Moreover, the 
research question is whether outsourcing lowers costs or not. Thus this definition focuses 
on the question at hand. 
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 The other independent variables of interest for this study include the number of 
pupils transported, the number of miles travelled, and the extent of the physical size of the 
school district. Other control variables include the full-time equivalent staff (FTE), 
population density at the county level, wages and benefits paid to transportation staff, and 
average gas prices at the county level. Pupils-FTE is a ratio of the total number of pupils in 
school district to the number of FTE in the district. This ratio helps capture the capacity of 
employees at managing pupils in the district. I provide a list of the variables of interest used 
in this study, and their definitions in Table 1. The third column in Table 1 also shows the 
expected signs of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in a regression. 
Since the effect of outsourcing on costs is inconclusive from the reviewed literature, I have 
not made any a priori assumptions for the variable. All other variables are expected to have 
positive coefficients.  
 As is the practice with most empirical papers that have examined the impact of 
outsourcing on transportation costs the dependent variable is defined as the log of some 
measure of costs (total transportation costs and cost per pupil transported in this study). 
Both total and average costs measures were converted to 2013 dollars, using the consumer 
price index for Minnesota, 2002-2013. This inflation adjusted measure of costs allows us to 
directly compare costs across the different years in this study.  
The sample size used in the analysis is 3,621 observations involving the 343 public 
school districts in Minnesota. Since most of the variables are recorded at the district level, I 
restrict all analysis to the district level. In the following subsections, the characteristics of 
outsourcing to and in-house producing districts are compared. 
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4.1 Characteristics of In-house and Outsourcing Districts in Minnesota 
This section describes the nature of school districts that outsource and those that 
provide pupil transportation in-house. For every academic year, school districts have to 
choose either to outsource the pupil transportation service or produce in-house. Based on 
this choice, the sample across all years can be divided in two: districts that outsource and 
those that provide the transportation service in-house. Figure 1 shows the costs and 
outsourcing trends for the typical district over the period, 2002-2013. It shows that the 
average cost of transportation per school district per year, and the percentage of districts 
fully outsourcing have declined over time.  About 40 percent of school districts outsourced 
in the early 2000s compared to 19 percent in 2013. The decline in outsourcing has been 
accompanied by a decrease in transportation costs per district over the period. The typical 
district spent about $1,000,000 on pupil transportation in 2002. This declined to $679,010 
by 2013, representing a 32 percent fall over the 20002 district average cost.  
Notwithstanding the trend in cost and outsourcing, Figure 1 does not necessarily 
imply that the costs of in-house provision of pupil transportation are lower than contractor-
operated costs. The declining cost may well be due to increased efficiency in the industry. 
It may also be due to noneconomic factors such as local politics and safety standards of 
contractor-operated buses. For instance, while two percent of public school districts‟ buses 
failed the mandatory safety inspection tests in the state, seven percent of all contractor-
operated buses failed the same tests during the 2013 year (Diedrich and O‟Brien, 2014). 
The largest contractor, First Pupil recorded an 85 percent pass rate.  
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Table 2 provides more details about the nature of the districts that outsource (see 
Outsource column of Table 2) and those that do not (see In-house column of Table 2). 
Table 2 shows that about 29 percent of the entire sample outsourced pupil transportation. 
About 17 the percent of all school districts are located in a metropolitan area. The average 
cost per district over the period is $867,331, with per-pupil cost at $474.  
There are some distinguishing features between school districts that fall under the 
In-house column in Table 2 and those under Outsource. School districts located in urban 
areas are more likely to outsource than those in rural Minnesota. School districts that 
outsourced pupil transportation are located in counties that are densely populated, have 
lower input prices (for example, gas and wages), but tend to have higher overall costs (for 
instance, total costs and per-pupil transportation costs), and transport more pupils.  This 
may suggest that either these outsourcing districts are inefficient or the high cost is 
observed because they outsourced. The average total cost per district over the period was 
$1.32 million in outsourcing districts but $680,522 for districts operating in-house. 
Average cost per-pupil transported was $464 for districts producing in-house but $500 for 
those using a contractor. Outsourcing school districts, however, transport about 80 percent 
more pupils than in districts where the service is provided in-house. Despite transporting 
more pupils, outsourcing school districts have higher per-pupil costs than those districts 
providing the service in-house. Districts outsourcing pupil transportation also have higher 
pupil-FTE ratios. The data reveals that the level of outsourcing varies positively with both 
cost and pupil-FTE ratio. Specifically, there is a positive and statistically significant 
correlation (ρ = 0.35) between total transportation cost and the level of outsourcing and a 
statistically significant and positive correlation (ρ = 0.26) between pupil-FTE ratio and the 
23 
 
level of outsourcing. These may suggest managerial issues that may arise with increasing 
number of pupils or contractors‟ preference for large school districts so that they 
(contractors) can enjoy scale economies (Lazarus and McCullough, 2005).  
A further examination of the data shows that each district can be put in one of three 
categories based on its outsourcing decision throughout the twelve year period, 2002-2013: 
Category 1 (those districts that never outsourced during the twelve year period), Category 2 
(involves those districts that have always used a contractor) and Category 3 (districts that 
switched between the two modes of production during the period under study). Category 3 
involves 111 school districts, constituting 32 percent of the 343 public school districts. The 
nature of Category 3 districts allows the researcher to observe a district‟s pre-contractor era 
costs and post-outsourcing adoption costs. This is a useful feature as it gives a truer 
indication of the impact of outsourcing on costs.  
Category 3 districts experienced an annual trend in average cost per district and 
outsourcing similar to the full sample in Figure 1. For instance, about 78 percent of all 
districts in this category used a contractor in 2002 to provide all of their pupil 
transportation needs. By 2013, only a quarter of these districts fully outsourced the pupil 
transportation function. With the decline in outsourcing, average cost per district also 
dropped from $1,184,917 in 2002 to $742,000 in 2013.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for this subsample of districts that 
switched (Category 3) production mode during the period. Overall, the subsample recorded 
higher costs compared to the full sample. For instance, average cost per district and average 
cost per pupil transported are $991,522 and $528, respectively. Both measures of costs are 
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higher than those for the full sample. This may suggests that high-cost districts are more 
likely to outsource or that outsourcing indeed increases costs.  
The districts in this subsample can also be grouped according to the outsourcing 
decision each district makes in each year. The average cost per district that outsourced in 
this subsample (Category 3) is lower than the full sample average. The percentage of 
districts outsourcing is also much higher (50.1 percent compared to 29 percent for the 
entire sample). These Category 3 districts are mostly less populated, but they transported 
many more pupils on average than outsourcing districts in the full sample. The average 
school size is also smaller; 186 square miles compared to the average 250 square miles for 
the full sample. Other notable differences include the higher than average pupil-FTE ratio, 
lower total benefits, and higher gas prices.  
Within this switch subsample, outsourced pupil transportation costs are also higher 
than in-house production costs, just as in the full sample.  Thus, similar to Table 2, districts 
under this category can be grouped under In-house and Outsource. Districts that outsource 
under this category recorded average of $1,228,608 per district and $546 per pupil. 
Districts providing pupil transportation in-house on the other hand have average cost per 
district at $748,082 and $511 per pupil.    
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the districts that outsource have higher costs. However, 
the descriptive analyses do not control for many factors that may affect costs. Thus, the 
positive correlation between costs and outsourcing may not necessarily mean causation. 
Thus, there is the need for further analysis in order to corroborate or reject this initial 
finding. As a matter of fact, the analysis thus far only shows the difference in costs between 
25 
 
districts that have outsourced and those producing in in-house. Whether the reason for this 
difference is due to outsourcing cannot be disentangled from the descriptive analysis and 
therefore the need for further examination. More so, these descriptive analyses fail to 
control for the endogeneity of the outsourcing decision. As will be demonstrated in later 
subsections of this study, a failure to correct for the endogeneity produces unreliable 
empirical results.  
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5.0 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Equation 1, below, specifies the form of the models to be estimated. The 
specification is similar to that used by Williams (1979), Viton (1981), Berndt et al. (1993), 
Friedlander et al. (1993), Nicosia (2001) and Iseki (2008, 2010) in studies on public transit 
systems in the U.S; and Lazarus and McCullough (2005), and Thompson (2011) in studies 
on pupil transportation. The model is estimated using the Minnesota school district-level 
data as described in the previous section. The model assumes that the typical school district 
outsources its pupil transportation service in order to minimize the costs of provision. The 
model also assumes that school districts have similar transportation technology such as 
buses and routing technology. 
                                      (1) 
where     is a measure of pupil transportation costs in district   in year  . The main 
outcome variables I used to help gauge the impact of outsourcing on costs are the 
logarithmic transformation of total costs and per pupil costs. In the case of panel datasets, 
the logarithmic transformation of the data straightens out exponential growth patterns and 
reduces heteroscedasticity. Examining per-unit cost measures is important since it is 
possible that overall costs could fall while average cost still rises. For instance, if a district 
loses many pupils over time, it is true that its total cost may fall, but total cost may not fall 
as fast and in such a case, average cost per pupil could end up being higher. On the other 
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hand, districts that are able to find better routing and other innovative ways of transporting 
pupils drive down average pupil cost even where the number of pupils needing 
transportation increases. The regressor of interest,    , is an indicator variable that equals 
one if a district relies fully on a contractor in the performance of its pupil transportation 
duties, and zero otherwise.      is a vector of output measures: log(miles), log(pupils 
transported), and log(area). The vector      contains other control variables: log(benefits), 
metropolitan indicator, population density, and pupil-FTE ratio. The term    denotes year 
fixed-effects, and i  denotes district fixed-effects.   
To estimate the causal effect of outsourcing on costs, the decision to outsource 
pupil transportation must be uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of cost captured in 
the error term,    , conditional on district fixed effects and observable characteristics. If 
costs determine the decision to outsource, then estimates of the effect of outsourcing on 
pupil transportation costs derived from OLS regression in Equation 1 would be 
inconsistent. 
 
5.1 The Endogenous Decision to Outsource  
As stated above, the decision to outsource is not randomly assigned to school 
districts. It may well be influenced by the transportation costs a school district observes. If 
this is the case, OLS estimates of outsourcing would be biased. In this section, I discuss the 
factors that may influence the decision to outsource in the public sector in the following 
subsection and the potential bias that may result in studies that fail to address the 
endogenous decision to outsource. The first stage regression results in this study also offers 
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insight into the some of the important determinants of outsourcing peculiar to pupil 
transportation industry.  
 
5.1.1. Factors Determining the Decision to Outsource in the Public Sector 
The choice between outsourcing and in-house production is a complex process of 
contract design, negotiations, monitoring and evaluation. The decision to outsource 
requires balancing efficiency goals with public values while considering the 
competitiveness of both public and private markets for government service (Warner & 
Hebdon, 2001). Not surprising, many reasons have been identified in the literature 
regarding why a government agency may decide to change from one form of service 
delivery to another (Bland, 2010; Bradbury & Waechter, 2009; Brown & Potoski, 2003; 
Brown et al., 2008; Fernandez & Smith, 1996; Hefetz & Warner, 2004; Hirsch, 1991; 
Hodge, 2000; Jang, 2006; Morgan & Kickham, 1999; Segal 2005; Thompson & Elling, 
2000; Warner & Hefetz, 2009).  
The lowering of costs is one of the most often cited factors contributing to the 
decision to outsource (Hirsch, 1995; Segal, 2005; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2015). Agencies 
observing an increasing growth in production costs “feel the pressure” to cut back and are 
therefore more likely to rely on an alternative mode of provision (Lamothe and Lamothe, 
2015). Segal (2005) reports that results from many studies suggest that outsourcing 
contributes in the range of 5 to 50 percent to costs reduction, depending on the scope and 
type of service, to the decision to outsource. Thus, local governments with restricted 
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revenue-raising abilities are more likely to turn to the private sector for the production of 
services (Benton & Menzel, 1992).  
Another reason for outsourcing, according to Savas (2000) and Van Slyke (2003), is 
due to political motives rather than economic considerations. Elected leaders strongly 
consider the role of the different groups within their community, their participation level, 
the political consequences of implementing decisions that go against their interests, and the 
perception the public will have of the outsourcing decisions made. Thus, Benton and 
Menzel (1992) conclude that outsourcing is more likely to occur in areas where groups 
with vested interests in government services have relatively less influence on service 
delivery options. In general, the research shows that members of minority groups, 
individuals with lower income, and the elderly typically see outsourcing as a threat to the 
quantity and quality of public programs (Fernandez & Smith, 2006; Morgan, Hirlinger, & 
England, 1988; Thompson & Elling, 2000). In addition to government structure, 
unionization, political influences, cost reductions, quality of services and economies of 
scale, fiscal mandates can also be influential in the choice between producing in-house and 
outsourcing. Local government units are subject to legal constraints from state constitutions 
and statutes and, therefore, have less control over their financial conditions.  
Labor unions have also been found to influence the level of outsourcing. Public 
employees often fear outsourcing will lead to layoffs, lower wages and benefits. Not 
surprising, unionization is a barrier to outsourcing. There is a natural interest in union to 
preserve their power and influence as well. Several studies have confirmed the negative 
relationship between outsourcing and labor unionization (Warner & Hebdon, 2001). 
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Fernandez and Smith (2006) for instance find that public sector employees‟ organizations 
in Georgia were more likely to oppose outsourcing programs than private sector 
employees.  
Finally, outsourcing has been found to be more likely among government agencies 
that have prior interaction with outside suppliers. Examining the determinants and 
consequences of outsourcing in more than 1,000 Texas school districts for 1997-2008, Rho 
(2013) finds that outsourcing is negatively related to spending on school districts‟ core 
instructional functions, budget shocks and enrollment shocks but positively related to 
school district performance and past experience with private contractors. 
All of the factors outlined thus are also potential instruments in an instrumental 
variable approach to dealing the endogenous outsourcing decision. As stated above, 
ignoring the reverse causality between costs and the decision to outsource leads to 
inconsistent estimates. If outsourcing leads to cost savings, then the expected sign of the 
outsource coefficient in the cost equation is negative. However, outsourcing is not 
randomly assigned to school districts. Instead, the decision to outsource may well be 
correlated with observable and unobservable factors that vary across districts and across 
time. As a result, the endogeneity of the outsourcing decision will likely bias the estimated 
coefficient on outsourcing if ignored. To illustrate, suppose the following model is to be 
estimated: 
                  (2) 
where all variables are defined as before in (1). If (2) is estimated without controlling for 
the endogenous nature of    , the estimated coefficient on outsourcing is given by: 
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 ̂     
   (       )
   (   )
 
(3) 
 
where  ̂  is the estimated impact and    is the population parameter. The direction of 
inconsistency is determined by the sign of    (       ). The direction of the bias is 
unclear, and reasonable arguments can be made for both a positive and a negative bias in 
the estimated coefficient. For example, many state legislatures have endorsed competitive 
outsourcing in order to reduce expenditures and deficits. Does this mean more high-cost 
districts or financially stressed districts are more likely to outsource? If high cost districts 
are more likely to adopt outsourcing in an effort to improve a precarious financial situation, 
the regression results are likely to be biased against finding a negative coefficient; since 
   (       )    in this case. It is also plausible that districts that have a predisposition 
toward financial conservatism, despite having low transportation costs, may still choose to 
outsource pupil transportation. If low cost districts are the districts choosing to outsource, 
the regression results are likely biased toward finding a negative coefficient. In that case, 
the estimated impact is greater than it should be:   ̂       . 
A consistent estimate for the effect of outsourcing on transportation costs can be 
recovered if there is at least one variable   that, in addition to being uncorrelated with the 
error term in Equation 1, is also a strong predictor of the likelihood of outsourcing in a 
school district in the following first stage regression: 
                           (4) 
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where     is the indicator variable for outsource decision of district   in year  ,    is the 
time fixed effect,    is a vector of school districts characteristics including pupil and other 
independent variables from (1), and     is an error term. The causal effect can be estimated 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
Given the preceding, I use the voting behavior of residents in the state‟s House 
elections and past experience with outside providers to instrument for the endogenous 
decision to outsource. The other determinants of outsourcing discussed above were not 
used as instruments because they were not available or did not satisfy the requirements 
necessary of a good instrument. A good instrument for the decision to outsource must 
satisfy two conditions. First, it must have a strong effect on the decision to outsource. 
Second, for instrument validity, 2SLS should retain only the variation in the likelihood of 
the decision to outsource that is generated by the quasi-experimental variation generated by 
the instrument. This means that the instruments should not be correlated with the 
unobserved determinants of pupil transportation costs. Intuitively, 2SLS allows us to 
compare the transportation costs of districts that differ in their propensity to outsource 
because they vote in a certain way or because a district dealt with an outside provider 
before the change in the law in 1998.  In this section, I show that the proposed instruments 
are both valid and relevant. 
The choice of voting behavior as an instrument is based on recent empirical work 
and theoretical exposition by Tadelis and Levin (2010), Besley and Coate (1997), and 
Osborne and Slivinski (1996). According to Tadelis and Levin (2010), education or health 
“complex” services and are therefore difficult to outsource. They however find that 
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Republican dominated areas tend to have to have a higher propensity to outsource such 
complex services to the private sector. Voter behavior as captured by vote shares obtained 
by political parties in an election or political representation in the legislature has also been 
proposed by Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2000), and Willcocks and Currie (1997). This 
voter behavior has been used by Nicosia (2002) and Iseki (2010) as exclusion restrictions 
in studies on public transit systems in the United States. Apart from these studies, Goldman 
and So (2009) suggest that members of the Republican Party are more likely to promote 
private sector participation in the public production process than their Democratic Party 
counterparts.  
The voting behavior of residents can be implemented by using the percentage share 
of votes received by each political party in the Minnesota State House elections or the 
political affiliation of the representative‟s district where the school district belongs.  As it 
turns out, however, using the categorical instrumental variable Republican, set equal to one 
if a school district‟s representative in the Minnesota State House belongs to the Republican 
Party, and zero otherwise, exhibits the strongest effect on the decision to outsource, as 
indicated by the high F-test values from the first-stage regression results in Table 6.  Thus 
if districts have a choice, Republican-dominated areas are more likely to push towards 
outsourcing. Also, based on the median voter theorem, it seems plausible that Republican-
dominated districts may have school boards dominated by Republicans, who would 
naturally have a higher probability of outsourcing than areas dominated by Democrats.  
As stated earlier, the empirical literature on the determinants of the decision to 
outsource shows that government agencies that have had previous experience with private 
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suppliers are also more likely to outsource. The study uses the variable Prior experience to 
capture this previous experience. To this end, the study sought to establish those school 
districts which used a private contractor before the change in the law governing basic 
education financing. The study relied heavily on mantra.com, an online hub of registered 
companies in Minnesota. With regards to firms in the pupil transportation industry, the site 
has the names of such companies, date of incorporation, location and when it first provided 
service to a particular school district. Prior experience is set equal one for school districts 
that ever used a contractor before the change in the law financing K-12 education in 
Minnesota and zero otherwise.  
From the first stage results in Table 6, both instruments are statistically significant, 
meaningful, and have the expected signs. These first stage results in this study offer an 
insight into the factors that may be important in a school district‟s decision to engage a 
contractor in the transportation of its pupils. The first stage regression results suggest that 
school districts that have Republican Party representatives in the Minnesota State House of 
Representatives are about 29 percent more likely to outsource. Population density and the 
number of school days are also statistically significant and positively affect the decision to 
outsource. On the other hand, the likelihood of outsourcing tends to decline with the total 
number of miles travelled by pupils. These findings suggest that geographically large 
school districts that are sparsely populated will therefore tend to have a lower likelihood of 
outsourcing the pupil transportation service.  
An initially surprising result from the first stage results is the fact that school 
districts with high wage bills are also less likely to outsource. This may however suggest 
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that there is strong opposition to outsourcing in such districts. Since there is no available 
measure of labor unionization at the district, the total benefits paid to transportation staff 
which is included here as an explanatory variable may also be capturing the effect of strong 
labor unions. Theoretically, the existence of strong labor unions tends to be positively 
correlated with workers‟ benefits. All other predictors were not statistically significant.  
An additional requirement for a good instrument is that it should not directly 
determine the outcome of the dependent variable, pupil transportation costs. For this 
condition to hold, the instrument should be uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants 
of pupil transportation costs. In this case, the correlation coefficient between the 
Republican and transportation costs is 0.025 and 0.011 between Prior Experience and 
transportation costs. A test of significance of the level of correlation between the dependent 
and the instrumental variables show no evidence any meaningful correlation.  
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6.0 RESULTS 
I present the results from various estimations in this section. I present results from 
estimations that do not address that the endogeneity of the outsourcing variable and results 
from the 2SLS. I estimate the main equation using the log of total transportation costs and 
the log of cost per pupil as the dependent variables. Other costs measures such as cost per 
mile and the fraction of a districts annual expenditure that goes into pupil transportation are 
also explored. These are useful since it is possible that production costs can increase due to 
other factors other than an increase in output. It is also possible that average production 
costs can fall even with an increase in the number of pupils transported if school districts 
can find more efficient alternatives of transporting these pupils. Thus examining only total 
cost may not reveal the true state of the effect of outsourcing on a school district‟s 
transportation costs. 
  
6.1. First Stage Results: The Decision to Outsource 
Tables 7 through 9 present the second stage regression results with different 
measures of costs as the dependent variable. In all tables, results from a fixed-effects 
regression are compared to results from the fixed-effects 2SLS. The Hausman test statistic 
was used to determine whether fixed-effects 2SLS regression procedure was necessary or 
straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was adequate. The first-stage of 
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the 2SLS involves a fixed-effects regression of the outsourcing dummy,    , on the 
remaining explanatory variables in the main regression equation, along with the 
instrumental variables, Republican and Prior experience7. The Republican variable 
assumes the value one where a school district falls under a legislative district whose 
representative belongs to the Republican Party. Prior experience assumes the value 1 if a 
district ever used a contractor in the provision of it pupil transportation before 1998; when 
the Minnesota statute governing pupil transportation funding was changed. 
Results from the first-stage are presented in Table 6. The results show that the 
coefficients on the instruments, Republican and Prior experience are positive and 
statistically significant under any meaningful statistical significance levels. This suggests 
that districts that are Republican or have Prior experience are more likely to outsource the 
pupil transportation function. As can be observed in Table 6, the R-squared from the first-
stage ranges from 19.1 percent to about 12 percent, and a joint test of significance of the 
instruments was about 98 in all the first stage regressions. Despite the strong statistical 
significance shown by the instruments, Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox (1996) an F statistic 
that is significant at the typical 5 or 10 percent level is not sufficient to justify the use of an 
instrumental variable. This is because a large R-squared or adjusted R-squared may occur if 
the endogenous variable is strongly correlated with the included exogenous variables but 
only weakly correlated with the instrument. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) thus suggest 
that the F statistic should exceed 10 for inference based on the 2SLS estimator to be 
                                                                 
7
 Hausman (2002) has famously referred to a probit first stage in a two stage regression as the “forbidden 
regression”. According to him, forbidden regression results in inconsistent results. The main reason for the 
inconsistency of the probit first stage followed by OLS in the second stage approach is that neither the 
expectations operator nor the linear projections operator passes through a non -linear first stage. Therefore the 
fitted values from a first stage probit are only uncorrelated with the second stage error term under very 
restrictive assumptions that almost never hold in practice.  
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reliable when there is one endogenous regressor.  The null hypothesis of each of the Stock-
Yogo (2005) tests is that the set of instruments is weak. If the test statistic exceeds the 
critical value, then the instrument(s) are not weak. The reported Stock-Yogo statistic from 
the 2SLS was 19.93, suggesting that the instruments Republican and Prior experience pass 
the Stock-Yogo weak identification tests. Also, the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald F 
statistic, and Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic add evidence that the instrument 
are not weak as can be seen in Table 6. 
 
6.2. Impact of outsourcing on transportation costs 
School districts, by law, are required to transport pupils who live more than two 
away from their homes to and from school on each school day. Outsourcing has been 
promoted as a means to reducing costs. School districts care about the number of pupils 
they must transport and the price tag that comes with providing the service. In Table 7, I 
present results from various regressions with log(transportation costs) as the dependent 
variable. Table 8 presents the results where the outcome variable is the log(per pupil 
transportation cost). The results in all estimations show that the coefficient of the 
outsourcing variable is positive8. This means outsourcing increases the costs of transporting 
students. Table 9 presents results two sets where the dependent variables are log(cost per 
mile) and cost-expenditure ratio. Cost here refers to the student transportation cost while 
expenditure refers to the total expenditure for a school district during the year. This last 
specification helps put student transportation costs in the dynamic nature of the education 
                                                                 
8
 The coefficient,   ̂ , on     is transformed as follows: ( 
  ̂   )       
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sector in Minnesota.  The main variable of interest in all specifications is “Outsource”. In 
all specifications, the outsource variable is set equal one for districts that fully contract out 
and zero otherwise9.  
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the pooled cross-sectional regression results with the 
outsourcing variable as the only explanatory variable. As the results show, outsourcing 
appears to be a very important determinant of costs. In column 2, all explanatory variable 
and year dummies are included but district fixed effects are eliminated. Column 2 shows 
that school districts have outsourced have costs that are 44.2 percent higher than districts 
producing in-house. The problem with column 2 estimates (as with studies that have 
followed the same procedure) is that it does not disentangle the difference in costs caused 
outsourcing from those that are difference that are specific to school districts. In column 3, 
where district specific differences are accounted for, the results show that outsourcing leads 
to about a 10 percent increase in costs. The results in column 3 however assume that the 
decision to outsource is randomly assigned to school districts. As discussed in previous 
sections, this may not be the case since the costs of transportation observed by a school 
district may well influence the decision to outsource. As a result, there is the need to 
correct for the potential endogeneity of the outsourcing decision. The results in column 
shows the results from a 2SLS regression of log(transportation costs) on all explanatory 
                                                                 
9
 Table 10 shows the results from the second stage of the FE 2SLS regression where the outsource variable is 
defined as the ratio of contractor-operated buses to total number of buses that served the school district during 
the year. Generally, the continuous variable nature here adds more information to the outsource variable but 
as explained in the main text, this definition is not appropriate in measuring the level of outsourcing taking 
place in the student transportation industry. The regression results are however in line with the general 
conclusion of this study; that correcting for the endogenous decision to outsource produces a much bigger 
effect of outsourcing on transportation costs. 
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variables. The results show that the outsourcing increases pupil transportation costs by 21 
percent.  
Table 8 presents results where the outcome variable is log(per pupil transportation 
costs). This is especially important in helping to reveal whether outsourcing gives a better 
value per dollar or not. As mentioned in the previous sections, rising costs is not a problem 
per se if it is accompanied an even faster growth in output. Thus evidence of rising total 
costs may not necessarily imply inefficiencies of contractor provided services. Results in 
Table 7 generally follow a similar trend as those presented in Table 7. As, shown in Table 
7, simple OLS results in column 2 are significantly different from the fixed-effect result in 
column 3. Basically, simple OLS overestimate the effect of outsourcing on costs. Columns 
4 present the results from the 2SLS. The results show that per pupil cost increases by 15.72 
percent when the endogenous decision is addressed. This result is higher than the about 11 
percent in column 3. The 2SLS results here also show that the increase in per pupil 
transportation costs due to outsourcing are lower than the estimated impact on total costs in 
Table 7. This buttresses the results from summary statics which show that school districts 
using contractors generally transported more pupils than school districts that produce in 
house. The results suggest that whilst total costs may have been risen due outsourcing, the 
number of pupils transported in outsourcing districts may have risen even faster. 
Another measure of costs effectiveness apart from per pupil costs is cost per mile. 
This is an important determinant of cost since it measures the cost per mile a district incurs 
during the school day. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the impact of outsourcing on 
the cost per travelled by all buses that served a school district during the school year. 
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Column 1 and 2 show the fixed-effects and fixed-effects 2SLS regression results. The 
results show that outsourcing increases cost per mile by about 3 percent where the 
endogeneity of the outsourcing variable is not addressed and 5.2 percent following the 
2SLS procedure.  
Many factors may influence the number of miles a school bus covers during school 
day. School districts with superior routing technical knowledge would observe operational 
costs, all things equal. The sheer size of district and may also imply buses may have to 
cover many miles each school day. Also, the maximum occupancy capacity may also 
influence the number of miles covered by school buses during the school day. The smallest 
school bus, Type A bus (carries a maximum of 36 pupils), may use less fuel per mile but it 
will also less fewer pupils than a Type D bus (which can carry a maximum of 90 pupils). 
According the DoE, most contractors in Minnesota use Type A and B buses. Although this 
is an optimal strategic choice given that larger school busses tend to increase specificity in 
relation to the pupil transportation industry, it also has consequence for costs and thus, a 
need examine a cost efficiency measure such as cost per mile. The coefficients of the 
outsourcing variable in both columns 1 and 2 here are much smaller than total cost and per 
pupil magnitudes. As explained in the previous sections, however, this cost measure may 
not be important to school district‟s objectives as far as pupil transportation is concerned. 
School districts are interested a safe mode of transportation that also get pupils to school on 
time. 
Outsourcing has been advocated as a means to reducing costs. Yet, as has been 
demonstrated here and from many of the previous empirical studies, outsourcing has not 
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proved to be an effective means to costs reduction. It is true that school districts care about 
the total outlays they have to contractors. Contractors equally care about the payments they 
receive from districts for the service(s) provided. One issue that has been observed in the 
outsourcing situation in Minnesota is the fact that contracts between districts and 
contractors are not fixed. The lack of fixed contracts means that contractors can potentially 
pass on any unforeseen costs to school districts. Given, that contract durations may make it 
difficult to terminate contracts, outlays to contractors as a proportion of a districts total 
expenditure will increase, forcing outsourcing districts to shift funds from other 
discretionary expenditure items. Also, to the extent that that a district insources in response 
to rising outlays to a contractor, does not mean overall outlays to contractors may reduce 
even if districts‟ budgetary allocations are not rising. For this reason, I examine whether 
there is any evidence in cost shifting by school districts in order to meet contractor 
payments. If such evidence does exist, then the burden of outsourcing on transportation 
costs as a proportion of the districts‟ total budget should be statistically significant. This 
examination of costs also helps focus the attention of school mangers on the manager 
drivers of costs. It also integrates the pupil transportation industry with other duties of the 
school district through the allocations made to various cost components. This view of 
transportation costs is also useful in benchmarking a district‟s transportation cost as 
compared with its neighbors or potential competitors (including contractors and nonpublic 
school districts). Any large deviations of a district transportation cost-budget ratio from the 
average district may indicate poor managerial decisions.  
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 9, the results of the cost-expenditure ratio regressions 
are presented. The results indicate that outsourcing increases this ratio. In particular 
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outsourcing increases pupil transportation cost by about 0.9 percent as shown in column 3. 
However, outsourcing increases costs by 1.91 percent when the endogeneity of the decision 
is addressed in 2SLS estimates in column 4. These results suggest that outsourcing places a 
burden on school districts‟ finance. It provides evidence that outsourcing either drives up 
pupil transportation costs faster than any increases in funding to school districts or because 
school districts have to shift funds from other projects or programs into moving pupils to 
and from school. 
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7.0 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The regression results show that outsourcing increases costs.  This may be 
explained by the fact that in many districts there is only one contractor, especially in 
Greater Minnesota. One precondition to outsourcing is the existence of a large number of 
contractors who can compete away any likely rents. An online search on school busing 
companies in Minnesota shows that most counties have only one registered company. An 
online listing of pupil busing companies at http://www.manta.com confirms this; only 15 
districts have more than one registered bus company. This means the envisaged 
competition among companies for the right to provide pupil transportation is lost. The 
puzzling question then is why school districts still outsource.  
One of the reasons why school districts may not in-source despite high costs is if 
board members believe their positions are threatened. School boards are likely to stick with 
a mode of providing pupil transportation if there is any likely resistance by parents. For 
instance, in a 2013 report commissioned by the state legislature, 41 percent of school 
district managers mentioned that parents/community will not support a shift in the mode 
pupil transportation is provided. As one respondent put it “why change something that 
already works”. This is a plausible explanation to keeping a contractor since school boards 
are elected by voters in the community they serve. Going against the “wishes” of parents 
means board member risking their seats on the school board. Given this reality and the 
knowledge that outsourcing increases costs, the decision to outsource need to be balanced 
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with other performance benchmarks that the outsourcing school district must meet over the 
course of the contract. For instance, the DoE can challenge school districts that outsource 
to improve pupil performance in standardized tests. This is because, despite imposing a 
burden on school districts, outsourcing possibly frees up man-hours which can then be used 
up fulfilling other important goals of the school district.  
School boards that find a threat to their position can however take some steps 
towards containing the attendant cost due to outsourcing. For instance the use of fixed 
contracts should be explored. Currently, there is a CPI clause in most contracts which 
allows for an upward adjustment in payments to contractors when the CPI increases. This 
means payments to contractors increase during inflationary periods even if gas prices and 
other important inputs peculiar to the pupil transportation industry do not increase. 
According to the DoE, Little Falls School District is the only school district that has 
negotiated fixed contract thus far. Using fixed cost contract, Little Falls is reported to have 
saved $24,000 in 2012. In return, Little Falls increases payments to its contractor whenever 
the State increases its allocation for pupil transportation budgets. By this, Little Falls is able 
to eliminate any burdens due outsourcing. This may be something all outsourcing school 
districts need to consider. 
There is also the need for districts to engage in some sharing or consolidation of 
their transportation needs. Some collaboration between school districts can give them 
leverage during contract negotiations. In addition, by collaborating, contractors may be 
able to transfer any gains in scale economies to school districts by way of lower contract 
bids. School districts are independently managed by a board and there no laws that 
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currently force collaboration between these school districts. This means school districts 
must be provided the incentive to collaborate. It is well established in the public choice that 
government bureaucrats generally have a desire to exercise control over their own budgets. 
This desire runs contrary to any desire for collaboration.  
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8.0 CONCLUSION 
School districts are facing rising deficits, and ever increasing demands in the quality 
and number of pupils they produce. Economic theory suggests the use of competitive 
outsourcing allows districts to maintain control over policy decisions while controlling 
their costs. Despite the widespread ex-ante support, the few studies that examined the pupil 
transportation industry present ambiguous empirical evidence. Most studies have been case 
studies and cross-sections that fail to control for both unobserved district specific 
characteristics, and the endogenous nature of the decision to outsource.  Most of the 
datasets used in the past studies have lacked information on the period before the adoption 
of outsourcing. Thus the results from these studies cannot be separated into cost differences 
due to the adoption of the outsourcing policy and the differences due to some preexisting 
differences. One unique feature of the data used in this paper, however, is the fact that a 
subsample contained information on both pre- and post-outsourcing adoption. This made it 
possible to disentangle differences in costs arising from the adoption of outsourcing from 
other factors that may influence costs. A further analysis of the subsample that switched 
between in-house and outsourcing further strengthens the results from using the full 
sample. In addition, this study controls for the endogeneity of the decision to outsource 
through the use of instrumental variables. 
Using a sample of 343 school districts over a twelve-year period, I implement a 
fixed-effects 2SLS estimation strategy. With the fixed-effects 2SLS, I account for districts‟ 
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heterogeneity as well as the endogenous decision to outsource.  The use of such a large 
dataset, and simultaneously addressing these issues have been absent in the literature on 
outsourcing in the pupil transportation industry. The second-stage results from the 2SLS 
show that ignoring the endogenous nature of the decision to outsource leads to results that 
understate the impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs. It is estimated that total 
transportation costs will increase by about 21 percent due to outsourcing, while average 
cost per pupils is estimated to increase by 15.7 percent. Cost per mile also shows a similar 
trend of increasing costs as a result of outsourcing, although the magnitudes here are 
relatively small. This study also argues that although all these methods of examining cost 
are important, probably an examination of cost which takes into consideration the entire 
operations of the school may be more useful. To this end, the burden of outsourcing to the 
school district was examined. The results here also show that outsourcing induces an 
adjustment of districts‟ discretionary budgets. In particular, this measure shows that 
outsourcing have to shift allocations from other discretionary expenditure programs in 
order to pay contractors. This examination of transportation costs shows that pupil 
outsourcing increases the share of student transportation cost by nearly 2 percent. This 
method of examining costs takes into the ever-changing nature of education sector in 
Minnesota. The summary statistics in this study shows that school districts experiencing 
high costs are more likely to outsource but the regression results do not support the 
anticipated cost savings from outsourcing.  
One shortcoming of this study is that it did not differentiate between the different 
types of contracts that may exist between school districts and contractors. Different clauses 
in contracts can yield totally different results even for the same school. This study also 
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argued that districts may care more about outsourcing only when it means sacrificing other 
programs. It will be important to explore a theoretical exposition of the rational bureaucrat 
who seeks to maximize her budget but constraint also by outsourcing part of that budget. 
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Table 1: Main Variables 
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Figure 1: Average Costs and Outsourcing per year, 2002-2013 
average cost %contracting
Variable Definition  Expected Sign 
Cost Total cost of transporting pupils in 2013 dollars  
Outsource  „1‟ if the buses the served a school district in a given year 
were all contractor operated buses, and „0‟ otherwise 
+/- 
Pupils Number of pupils transported + 
Miles Number of vehicle miles + 
Area Area of school district in square miles + 
School days Number of days that school is in session + 
Salary Salary of transportation staff (in 2013 dollars) + 
Gas price Average cost of gas at the county level + 
Population  Number of people in the county + 
FTE Number of full-time equivalent employees +/- 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics: Full Sample 
 
Full Sample In-house Outsource 
Variable Mean 
Std 
Deviation Mean 
Std  
Deviation Mean 
 Std 
Deviation 
Cost 867,331 1,245,540 680,522 1,030,527 1,321,693 1,565,950 
Cost per student 474.78 331.60 464.05 368.49 500.88 215.07 
Outsource 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Students 2450 4745 1983 4191 3585 5722 
Schooldays 170.83 3.89 170.68 4.01 171.21 3.53 
Area 250.80 347.46 287.35 398.46 161.92 130.81 
Pop. Density 260 614.26 212 561 375 716.05 
Miles 153,112 306,420 151,133 310,266 157,925 296,948 
Pupil-staff ratio 13.02 2.10 12.64 2.14 13.96 1.68 
Metro. area 0.17 0.38 0.11 0.32 0.30 0.46 
Total Benefits 498,302 998,708 509,087 1,017,215 472,072 952,154 
Av. gas price 3.49 0.66 3.53 0.65 2.70 0.65 
Observations 3621 
 
2566 
 
1055 
  
Note 
1) Pop. density= population density at the county level 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics (Switch Subsample) 
 
Full In-house Outsource 
Variable Mean 
Std  
Deviation Mean 
Std  
Deviation Mean 
Std  
Deviation 
Cost 991,522 1,050,472 748,082 802,640  1,228,608 1,199,348 
Cost per student 528.36 225.70 510.74 226.95 545.52 223.33 
Outsource 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 0 
Students 2,597 4,452 2,039 4,152 3,140 4,665 
Schooldays 171.89 4.00 170.52 4.43 171.26 3.50 
Area 186.29 138.63 188.30 121.47 184.34 153.60 
Pop. 260 614.26 212 561 375 716.05 
Miles 141,017 190,698 155,221 156,857 127,183 217,923 
Student-staff ratio 13.35 1.78 13.03 1.76 13.65 1.75 
Metro 0.22 0.42 0.1675 0.3737 0.28 0.45 
Total Benefits 355,697 691,578 362,657 582,332 348,920 783,900 
Av. gas  prices 3.51 0.67 3.75 0.54 3.26 0.67 
Observations 1055 
 
538 
 
516 
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Table 6: First Stage Regression Results  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 
(1) First stage results associated with log total transportation costs as the dependent variable in the second stage . 
This is the same first stage results associated with transportation cost-expenditure ratio as the dependent variable. 
(2) First stage results associated with log cost per pupil as the dependent variable in the second stage 
(3) First stage results associated with log cost per mile as the dependent variable in the second stage 
(4) Outsource here is defined as the ratio of buses used by a contractor to total number of buses that served a district 
during a year. First stage results here are associated with log total transportation costs as the dependent variable in 
the second stage. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Outsource Outsource Outsource Outsource 
     
Prior experience 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.279*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0298) (0.0178) 
Republican 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.240* 0.257* 
 (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.1295) (0.157) 
Log(Pupils) -0.0237  -0.0210 0.0159 
 (0.0433)  (0.0460) (0.0276) 
Schooldays 0.00281* 0.00280* 0.00289* 0.00105 
 (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00149) (0.000891) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.0888*** 0.0898*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0334) (0.0200) 
Log(Miles) -0.00317 -0.00337 -0.00783** -0.00309 
 (0.00361) (0.00360) (0.00368) (0.00221) 
Pupil-staff -0.00166  -0.00231 0.00165 
 (0.00440)  (0.00454) (0.00272) 
Log(Wages) -0.0457*** -0.0455*** -0.0443*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00504) (0.00302) 
Gas prices 0.0249 -0.0136 0.0622 -0.00305 
 (0.0659) (0.0536) (0.0679) (0.0407) 
FTE Staff  -1.61e-05   
  (0.000199)   
Constant -0.218 0.211 -0.904 -0.184 
 (1.026) (0.895) (1.062) (0.636) 
Observations 3,620 3,621 3,620 3,620 
R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.148 0.118 
Number of id 343 343 343 343 
First stage regression diagnostics for 2SLS 
F-statistic 52.95 38.52 28.31 44.49 
Stock-Yogo 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
C-D Wald F 133 134.19 43.19 51.31 
Sargan p-value .855 .35 .31 .48 
LM 248.88 249.41 84.63 87.2 
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Table 7: Regression results from log(total transportation cost) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)-OLS (2)-OLS (3)-FE (4)-2SLS 
     
Outsource 0.974*** 0.366*** 0.0945*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0186) (0.0179) (0.0652) 
Log(Pupils)  0.747*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 
  (0.0441) (0.0462) (0.0463) 
schooldays  -0.00543*** 0.00533*** 0.00515*** 
  (0.00196) (0.00154) (0.00156) 
Log(Pop. Density)  -0.0821*** 0.107*** 0.0971*** 
  (0.00630) (0.0347) (0.0353) 
Log(Miles)  0.0356*** 0.00811** 0.00862** 
  (0.00515) (0.00381) (0.00383) 
Pupil-Staff Ratio  -0.0254*** -0.0108** -0.0106** 
  (0.00383) (0.00469) (0.00470) 
Log(Wages)  -0.0464*** -0.00703 -0.00208 
  (0.00643) (0.00526) (0.00616) 
Gas Price  0.231*** 0.361*** 0.357*** 
  (0.0423) (0.0700) (0.0702) 
Constant 13.04*** 5.897*** 5.172***  
 (0.0662) (0.533) (1.089)  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,621 3,620 3,620 3,620 
R-squared 0.158 0.858 0.241 0.234 
Num. of Districts   343 343 
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Table 8: Regression results from log (Cost Per Pupil) 
 (1)-OLS (2)-OLS (3)-FE (4)-2SLS 
     
Outsource  0.255*** 0.343*** 0.104*** 0.146** 
 (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0696) 
Schooldays  -0.00379* 0.00521*** 0.00483*** 
  (0.00202) (0.00167) (0.00166) 
Log(Pop. Density)  -0.0958*** 0.116*** 0.0863** 
  (0.00634) (0.0375) (0.0377) 
Log(Miles)  0.0318*** 0.00414 0.00474 
  (0.00528) (0.00412) (0.00409) 
Staff  -0.000110*** 0.000359 0.000348 
  (3.58e-05) (0.000230) (0.000227) 
Log(Wages)  -0.0437*** -0.00475 0.00134 
  (0.00663) (0.00569) (0.00657) 
Gas Prices  -0.0271** -0.567*** -0.568*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0616) (0.0609) 
Constant 6.129*** 7.870*** 14.00***  
 (0.0310) (0.399) (1.029)  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621 
R-squared 0.085 0.258 0.151 0.147 
Number of Districts   343 343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Regression results from log(Cost per mile) and Transport cost-expenditure ratio  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)  (2)-2SLS (3) (4)-2SLS 
Dependent  
variable: 
Log(cost per 
mile) 
Log(cost per 
mile) 
Cost-Expenditure 
Ratio 
Cost-Expenditure 
Ratio 
     
Outsource 0.0300** 0.0507*** 0.0092*** 0.0191*** 
 (0.0138) (0.00999) (0.000879) (0.00548) 
Log(Students) -0.0722** -0.0571 0.00547** 0.00578** 
 (0.0354) (0.0414) (0.00226) (0.00231) 
Schooldays -0.00241** -0.00380*** 0.000315*** 0.000286*** 
 (0.00118) (0.00141) (7.56e-05) (7.84e-05) 
Log(Pop. 
Density) 
-0.0874*** -0.138*** 0.00981*** 0.00876*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0328) (0.00170) (0.00182) 
Students-Staff  
Ratio 
0.00992*** 0.0111*** -0.000252 -0.000230 
 (0.00359) (0.00420) (0.000230) (0.000234) 
Log(Wages) -0.00960** 0.0147** -0.00114*** -0.000629* 
 (0.00404) (0.00688) (0.000258) (0.000380) 
Gas Prices -0.143*** -0.161** -0.0342*** -0.0345*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0628) (0.00343) (0.00350) 
Log(Miles)   0.000326* 0.000380** 
   (0.000187) (0.000192) 
Constant 3.939***  0.495***  
 (0.834)  (0.0534)  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,620 3,620 3,620 3,620 
R-squared 0.459 0.260 0.274 0.224 
Number of 
districts 
343 343 343 343 
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APPENDIX B: 2SLS-FE REGRESSION RESULTS WITH A CONTINUOUS 
OUTSOURCING VARIABLE 
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Table 10: 2SLS-FE Regression results with a continuous outsourcing variable                                           
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Note: The outsourcing variable here is defined as the ratio of contractor-operated buses to the total 
number of buses serving a school district during the school year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log(cost) Log(cost per  
student) 
Log (cost per  
mile) 
Cost-expenditure  
ratio 
     
Outsource 0.378* 0.285 0.0910*** 0.0357*** 
 (0.198) (0.196) (0.191) (0.00972) 
Log(Students) 0.153***  -0.0778* 0.00500** 
 (0.0451)  (0.0431) (0.00221) 
School days 0.00520*** 0.00495*** -0.00328** 0.000304*** 
 (0.00152) (0.00166) (0.00145) (7.46e-05) 
Log(Pop. Density) 0.0788** 0.0731* -0.177*** 0.00713*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0419) (0.0378) (0.00193) 
Log(Miles) 0.00827** 0.00439  0.000341* 
 (0.00374) (0.00408)  (0.000184) 
Student-staff  -0.0117**  0.00818* -0.000340 
 (0.00459)  (0.00439) (0.000226) 
FTE Staff  0.00032   
  (0.00023)   
Log(Wages) -0.00600 -0.00162 0.00295 -0.00105*** 
 (0.00591) (0.00632) (0.00567) (0.000290) 
     
Observations 3,620 3,621 3,620 3,620 
R-squared 0.271 0.151 0.195 0.281 
Number of districts 343 343 343 343 
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APPENDIX C: SCHOOL DISTRICTS DATA USED IN THIS STUDY 
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County Name School District 
Aitkin County Mcgregor 
Aitkin County Hill City 
Aitkin County Aitkin 
Anoka County St. Francis 
Anoka County Spring Lake Park 
Anoka County Centennial 
Anoka County Columbia Heights 
Anoka County Anoka-Hennepin 
Anoka County Fridley 
Becker County Detroit Lakes 
Becker County Lake Park Audubo 
Becker County Pine Point 
Becker County Frazee 
Beltrami County Red Lake 
Beltrami County Bemidji 
Beltrami County Blackduck 
Beltrami County Kelliher 
Benton County Sauk Rapids 
Benton County Foley 
Big Stone County Ortonville 
Big Stone County Clinton-Gracevil 
Blue Earth County St. Clair 
Blue Earth County Mankato 
Blue Earth County Maple River 
Blue Earth County Lake Crystal-Wel 
Brown County Sleepy Eye 
Brown County Springfield 
Brown County Comfrey 
Brown County New Ulm 
Carlton County Cloquet 
Carlton County Esko 
Carlton County Carlton 
Carlton County Wrenshall 
Carlton County Cromwell 
Carlton County Barnum 
Carlton County Moose Lake 
Carver County Norwood 
Carver County Waconia 
Carver County Watertown-Mayer 
Carver County Chaska 
Cass County Northland Commun 
Cass County Pillager 
Cass County Pine River-Backu 
Cass County Walker-Hackensac 
Cass County Cass Lake-Bena S 
Chippewa County Montevideo 
Chippewa County M.A.C.C.R.A.Y. 
Chisago County Rush City 
Chisago County North Branch 
Chisago County Chisago Lakes 
Chisago County Franconia 
Clay County Moorhead 
Clay County Ulen-Hitterdal 
Clay County Hawley 
Clay County Dilworth-Glyndon 
Clay County Barnesville 
Clearwater County Bagley 
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Clearwater County Clearbrook-Gonvi 
Cook County Cook County 
Cottonwood Count. Red Rock Central 
Cottonwood Count Windom 
Cottonwood Count Mountain Lake 
Cottonwood Count Westbrook-Walnut 
Crow Wing County Crosby-Ironton 
Crow Wing County Brainerd 
Crow Wing County Pequot Lakes 
Dakota County Farmington 
Dakota County Burnsville 
Dakota County Inver Grove 
Dakota County West St. Paul-Me 
Dakota County Lakeville 
Dakota County South St. Paul 
Dakota County Randolph 
Dakota County Hastings 
Dakota County Rosemount-Apple 
Dodge County Hayfield 
Dodge County Triton 
Dodge County Kasson-Mantorvil 
Douglas County Alexandria 
Douglas County Evansville 
Douglas County Brandon 
Douglas County Osakis 
Faribault County Blue Earth Area 
Faribault County United South Cen 
Fillmore County Fillmore Central 
Fillmore County Rushford-Peterso 
Fillmore County Mabel-Canton 
Fillmore County Kingsland 
Fillmore County Lanesboro 
Freeborn County Alden 
Freeborn County Glenville-Emmons 
Freeborn County Albert Lea 
Goodhue County Red Wing 
Goodhue County Kenyon-Wanamingo 
Goodhue County Pine Island 
Goodhue County Goodhue 
Goodhue County Cannon Falls 
Grant County Herman-Norcross 
Grant County West Central Are 
Grant County Ashby 
Hennepin County Richfield 
Hennepin County Bloomington 
Hennepin County Westonka 
Hennepin County Robbinsdale 
Hennepin County Brooklyn Center 
Hennepin County Hopkins 
Hennepin County Osseo 
Hennepin County Eden Prairie 
Hennepin County Wayzata 
Hennepin County Minneapolis 
Hennepin County Orono 
Hennepin County Edina 
Hennepin County St. Anthony-New 
Hennepin County Minnetonka 
Hennepin County St. Louis Park 
Houston County Lacrescent-Hokah 
Houston County Caledonia 
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Houston County Spring Grove 
Houston County Houston 
Hubbard County Nevis 
Hubbard County Laporte 
Hubbard County Park Rapids 
Isanti County Cambridge-Isanti 
Isanti County Braham 
Itasca County Deer River 
Itasca County Greenway 
Itasca County Grand Rapids 
Itasca County Nashwauk-Keewati 
Jackson County Jackson County C 
Jackson County Heron Lake-Okabe 
Kanabec County Mora School District 
Kanabec County Ogilvie School 
District 
Kandiyohi County New London-Spice 
Kandiyohi County Willmar 
Kittson County Kittson Central 
Kittson County Lancaster 
Kittson County Tri-County 
Koochiching  International Fa 
Koochiching  Littlefork-Big F 
Koochiching 
County 
South Koochichin 
Lac Qui Parle  Bellingham 
Lac Qui Parle  Dawson-Boyd 
Lac Qui Parle Lac Qui Parle Va 
Lake County Lake Superior 
Lake of the Woods 
County 
Lake Of The Wood 
Le Sueur County Waterville-Elysi 
Le Sueur County Cleveland 
Le Sueur County Lecenter 
Le Sueur County Montgomery-Lonsd 
Le Sueur County Lesueur-Henderso 
Lincoln County Hendricks 
Lincoln County Ivanhoe 
Lincoln County Lake Benton 
Lincoln County Rtr Public Schools 
Lincoln County Tyler 
Lyon County Tracy 
Lyon County Lakeview 
Lyon County Minneota 
Lyon County Balaton 
Lyon County Lynd 
Lyon County Marshall 
Lyon County Russell 
Mcleod County Hutchinson 
Mcleod County Mcleod West Scho 
Mcleod County Glencoe-Silver L 
Mcleod County Lester Prairie 
Mahnomen County Mahnomen 
Mahnomen County Waubun 
Marshall County Stephen-Argyle C 
Marshall County Grygla 
Marshall County Marshall County 
Marshall County Warren-Alvarado- 
Martin County Martin County We 
Martin County Fairmont Area Sc 
Martin County Granada Huntley- 
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Martin County Truman 
Meeker County Dassel-Cokato 
Meeker County Litchfield 
Meeker County A.C.G.C. 
Meeker County Eden Valley-Watk 
Mille Lacs County Milaca 
Mille Lacs County Isle 
Mille Lacs County Princeton 
Mille Lacs County Onamia 
Morrison County Pierz 
Morrison County Upsala 
Morrison County Royalton 
Morrison County Little Falls 
Morrison County Swanville 
Mower County Lyle 
Mower County Austin 
Mower County Grand Meadow 
Mower County Southland 
Mower County Leroy 
Murray County Fulda 
Murray County Murray County Ce 
Nicollet County St. Peter 
Nicollet County Nicollet 
Nobles County Adrian 
Nobles County Brewster 
Nobles County Worthington 
Nobles County Ellsworth 
Nobles County Round Lake 
Norman County Norman County Ea 
Norman County Norman County We 
Norman County Ada-Borup 
Olmsted County Byron 
Olmsted County Chatfield 
Olmsted County Rochester 
Olmsted County Dover-Eyota 
Olmsted County Stewartville 
Otter Tail County Underwood 
Otter Tail County Battle Lake 
Otter Tail County Fergus Falls 
Otter Tail County Parkers Prairie 
Otter Tail County Perham 
Otter Tail County Henning 
Otter Tail County Pelican Rapids 
Otter Tail County New York Mills 
Pennington County Thief River Fall 
Pennington County Goodridge 
Pine County Willow River 
Pine County Pine City 
Pine County Hinckley-Finlays 
Pine County East Central 
Pipestone County Pipestone-Jasper 
Pipestone County Ruthton 
Pipestone County Edgerton 
Polk County Fertile-Beltrami 
Polk County Fosston 
Polk County Win-E-Mac 
Polk County Crookston 
Polk County Climax 
Polk County East Grand Forks 
Polk County Fisher School District 
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Pope County Cyrus 
Pope County Minnewaska 
Ramsey County St. Paul 
Ramsey County White Bear Lake 
Ramsey County Roseville 
Ramsey County North St Paul-Ma 
Ramsey County Mounds View 
Red Lake County Oklee 
Red Lake County Red Lake Falls 
Red Lake County Plummer 
Redwood County Redwood Falls Ar 
Redwood County Wabasso 
Redwood County Cedar Mountain 
Redwood County Milroy 
Renville County Buffalo Lake-Hec 
Renville County Renville County 
Renville County Bird Island-Oliv 
Rice County Northfield 
Rice County Faribault 
Rock County Hills-Beaver Cre 
Rock County Luverne 
Roseau County Roseau 
Roseau County Greenbush-Middle 
Roseau County Badger 
Roseau County Warroad 
St. Louis County Proctor 
St. Louis County Mesabi East 
St. Louis County Virginia 
St. Louis County Hermantown 
St. Louis County St. Louis County 
Nett Lake Nett Lake 
St. Louis County Duluth 
St. Louis County Eveleth-Gilbert 
St. Louis County Chisholm 
St. Louis County Hibbing 
St. Louis County Ely 
St. Louis County Floodwood 
St. Louis County Mountain Iron-Bu 
Scott County Jordan 
Scott County New Prague 
Scott County Prior Lake 
Scott County Shakopee 
Scott County Belle Plaine 
Sherburne County Becker 
Sherburne County Big Lake 
Sherburne County Elk River 
Sibley County Sibley East 
Sibley County G.F.W. 
Stearns County Sauk Centre 
Stearns County Paynesville 
Stearns County Kimball 
Stearns County Sartell 
Stearns County Rocori 
Stearns County Melrose 
Stearns County Belgrade-Brooten 
Stearns County St. Cloud 
Stearns County Holdingford 
Stearns County Albany 
Steele County Medford 
Steele County Blooming Prairie 
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Steele County Owatonna 
Stevens County Hancock 
Stevens County Chokio-Alberta 
Stevens County Morris 
Swift County Benson 
Swift County Kerkhoven-Murdoc 
Todd County Bertha-Hewitt 
Todd County Long Prairie-Gre 
Todd County Staples-Motley 
Todd County Eagle Valley 
Todd County Browerville 
Traverse County Browns Valley 
Traverse County Wheaton Area Sch 
Wabasha County Lake City 
Wabasha County Elgin-Millville 
Wabasha County Plainview 
Wabasha County Zumbrota-Mazeppa 
Wabasha County Wabasha-Kellogg 
Wadena County Wadena-Deer Cree 
Wadena County Verndale 
Wadena County Menahga 
Wadena County Sebeka 
Waseca County N.R.H.E.G. 
Waseca County Waseca 
Waseca County Janesville-Waldo 
Washington South Washington 
County 
Washington 
County 
Mahtomedi 
Washington 
County 
Forest Lake 
Washington 
County 
Stillwater 
Watonwan County Butterfield 
Watonwan County Madelia 
Watonwan County St. James 
Wilkin County Breckenridge 
Wilkin County Campbell-Tintah 
Wilkin County Rothsay 
Winona County Lewiston-Altura 
Winona County St. Charles 
Winona County Winona Area Publ 
Wright County Rockford 
Wright County Annandale 
Wright County Howard Lake-Wave 
Wright County Delano 
Wright County St. Michael-Albe 
Wright County Maple Lake 
Wright County Buffalo 
Wright County Monticello 
Yellow Med. Count Canby 
Yellow Med. Count Yellow Medicine 
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